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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant submits to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
the following Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUER 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
(A) Whether appellant has right to exercise defense 
provided in 70A-3-419(3) of the Utah Code Annotated, and; 
(B) Whether the District Court wrongfully followed the case 
of Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Calif. 1973), which held 
that the phrase "proceeds remaining in his hands" as provided by 
§3-419(3) referring to the extent of liability, means any funds 
remaining in the vaults of the bank and did not mean the funds 
that remained in the bank as a result of dealing with only the 
check with the forged indorsement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Pacific Indemnity Company ("Pacific Indemnity") 
commenced the present action against several defendants, of which 
one was Bonneville Bank of Utah, seeking to recover losses 
suffered as a consequence of an embezzlement scheme by which 
defendant Brereton, as a salesman for Triad Systems Corporation, 
indorsed and deposited into a person checking account a number of 
customer checks intended for his employer. In all, ten customer 
checks were involved. Four, totalling $44,000.00, were drawn 
upon First Security Bank. The remaining six, totalling 
1 
$22,000.00, were drawn upon Zions Bank. 
Of the $66,000.00 originally involved, Brereton "forwarded" 
$3 0,000.00 to his employer by two separate cashier's checks, each 
purchased in the name of a customer whose own checks had been 
stolen. At the time the scheme was discovered, there remained an 
unrecovered loss of $36,000.00, which was thereafter paid under 
employee fidelity coverage furnished by respondent's insurer. 
Respondent brought this action as subrogee to Triad's rights as 
the owner of the converted instruments. 
Defendant Brereton permitted entry of default judgment 
against him on December 15, 1982. By informal agreement among 
the remaining parties, plaintiff's action was held in abeyance 
pending restitutionary efforts by Brereton. Although Brereton 
did come to further reduce respondent's loss, he has been unable 
to maintain reasonable repayment terms and a total of 
approximately $2 6,000.00 remains unrecovered. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The specifics of Mr. Brereton's activities are detailed in 
his affidavit, including the statement attached thereto as 
Exhibit "A-l" (and reproduced in typewritten form as "A-2"). Of 
all the facts involved, defendant believes the following to be 
undisputed and sufficient to find reason for reversal of the 
motion for summary judgment which was granted by the District 
Court. 
Between approximately December 5, 1980, and June 16, 1981, 
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Jerry Brereton forged indorsement to no fewer than ten customer 
checks intended for Triad Systems Corporation and deposited those 
checks into a person account at Bonneville Bank in Provo that Mr. 
Brereton had established under the name of "Triad Systems." 
Of the ten checks, only two were made out to "triad Systems 
Corp." The other eight checks were made out to either Triad, or 
Triad Systems. [Exhibits B-l and B-10] 
Four of the checks were drawn upon and paid to Bonneville 
Bank by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. in amount totalling 
$44,000.00. [Brereton Affidavit at Para. 4 and Exhibits B-l, B-
2, B-4, and B-8 thereto; Affidavit of Joe F. Deniro at Paras. 8, 
12, 16, and 20]. 
The remaining six checks were drawn upon and paid to 
Bonneville Bank by Ziojis First National Bank in amounts totalling 
$22,000.00. [Brereton Affidavit at paras. 4 and 5 and Exhibits 
B-3, B-5, B-6, B-9 and B-10 thereto]. 
The initial indorsement on all checks was provided by Jerry 
Brereton, who stamped "For deposit only, Triad Systems 11-
005139" on the reverse side of each checks before depositing it 
in his account at Bonneville Bank [Brereton Affidavit at para. 
5]. 
On or about May 4 or 5, 1981, Mr. Brereton purchased and 
sent Triad systems Corporation a cashier's check in the amount of 
$20,000.00 purchased in the name of customer Five Star Motor 
Supply and a separate cashier's check in the amount of $10,000.00 
purchased in the name of customer No. 1 Performance [Brereton 
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Affidavit at Exhibit "A-2"]. 
At no time throughout the entire period that Mr. Brereton 
was embezzling the checks from Triad Systems Corp., did Triad 
Systems Corp. become aware of the scheme, until Mr. Brereton 
notified them. [Brereton Affidavit at Exhibit "A-2"]. 
Mr. Brereton embezzled a total of $66,000.00 from Triad 
Systems Corp., all but $26,038.07 of which has been paid back. 
The net embezzlement loss caused by Mr. Brereton was 
recovered by Triad Systems Corp. under employee fidelity 
insurance coverage furnished by Pacific Indemnity Company 
[Brereton Affidavit at para. 6]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The language of section 70A-3-419(3) of the Utah Code is 
clear and unambiguous. It clearly provides a depositary bank 
with a defense when it has acted in good faith and in accordance 
with reasonable commercial standards in dealing with a forged 
instrument. Appellant is entitled to this defense which allows 
Respondent the right to recovery of only the proceeds of the 
forged indorsement that remain in the Appellant's hands. The 
district court's interpretation of the word "proceeds" is also 
incorrect. The holding of Cooper v. Union Bank, which was 
adopted by the district court [appendix C-5, C-8], is an example 
of circular reasoning and a refusal to acknowledge the clear 
language of the code and the legislative intent of the drafters. 
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The word "proceeds" should be interpreted to mean the funds 
remaining as a result of the check with which Appellant dealt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BONNEVILLE BANK IS ENTITLED TO THE 
DEFENSE PROVIDED IN 70A-3-419(3) AS THE LANGUAGE 
OF THE CODE IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The language of section 3-419(3) clearly provides that 
Defendant-Appellant Bonneville Bank is a representative, as 
intended by the drafter of the code, to be entitled to the 
defense provided in that section. 
Section 70A-3-419(3) states: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning 
restrictive indorsements a representative, including a 
depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith 
and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards 
applicable to the business of such representative dealt 
with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who 
was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or 
otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any 
proceeds remaining in his hands. 
The language of this section is unambiguous and clearly 
provides for a defense on the part of a depositary bank when it 
acts in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial 
standards. Section 3-419 comment 5 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code is also clear when it describes the intent of the section. 
It states that subsection (3) "is intended to adopt the rule of 
decisions which has held that a representative, such as a broker 
or depositary bank, who deals with a negotiable instrument for 
his principal in good faith is not liable to the true owner for 
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conversion of the instrument" except to the extent of the 
proceeds that remain in the hands of the depositary bank. 
Several cases have held that the language of 3-419(3) is 
indisputably clear. For example, in Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank 
and Trust Co., 97 N.J. 1, 477 A.2d 806 (1984) the court 
recognized that "§ 3-419(3) is phrased in clear and plain 
language, that to apply this provision in accordance with its 
unambiguous meaning constitutes a reasonable-not an absurd-policy 
choice by the Legislature, and further, that there is some 
historical extrinsic support evidencing an underlying intent on 
the part of the drafters that is consistent with this application 
of the provision." at 813. 
The court in Mateo Tools Corp. v. Pontiac State Bank, 614 
F.Supp. 1059 (E.D.Mich. 1985), was similarly persuaded 
summarizing several other decisions stating that "five more 
recent decisions, including three by state supreme courts, hold 
that any construction of section 3-419(3) which denies its 
application to depository banks, while perhaps based on good 
policy reasons, violates the clear language of the section. See 
Jackson Vitrified China Co. v. People's American Nat'l Bank of 
North Miami, 388 So.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fla.App.1980); Denn v. 
First State Bank of Spring Lake Park, 316 N.W.2d 532, 537 
(Minn.1982); Hydroflo Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 217 
Neb. 20, 26, 349 N.W.2d 615, 619 (1984); Knesz v. Central Jersey 
Bank and trust Co.. 97 N.J. 1, 18, 477 A.2d 806, 815 (1984); 
Stevens-Daniels Corp. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 651, 
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653 (Tex.App.1984)." at 1064 
The policy to which the court refers is the warranty under 
which the drawee bank would be able to sue the depository bank. 
There is a strict warranty of liability from the depository bank 
to the drawee bank. However, the drawee bank is entitled to its 
own defense under § 3-406. This section provides a defense in 
cases where there has been contributory negligence on the part of 
the owner of the instrument, i.e. they were negligent in allowing 
access to an automatic signature machine, etc, a defense which 
could have been asserted in the present case. If this defense 
was asserted by the drawee bank and the drawee bank were to win, 
the only cause of action left to the owner of the instrument 
would be one against the depository bank. It is at this point 
that the defense provided for by §3-419(3) becomes most 
important. It is conceivable, therefore, that if the owner of 
the instrument was contributorily negligent and the depository 
bank acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 
commercial standard, that the owner of the instrument would not 
be able to recover from either of the banks. 
In addition, an equitable argument may be made on the notion 
that providing for some defense in circumstances where the 
depositary bank dealt in good faith and in accordance with 
reasonable commercial standards, a more conducive atmosphere for 
ease of banking is created. 
The fact that Appellant has a right to the defense outlined 
in 70A-3-419 should not be disputed. The only issue that remains 
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is what the court should define as "proceeds." 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BONNEVILE BANK SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE 
ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE PROCEEDS THAT REMAIN IN ITS 
HANDS, AND "PROCEEDS" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN ONLY 
THE FUNDS WHICH REMAIN IN ITS HANDS AS A DIRECT RESULT OF 
DEALING WITH THE INSTRUMENT FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFF IS SUING 
The district court in the present case followed the case of 
Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Calif. 1973) and concluded 
that the phrase "proceeds remaining in his hands" refers to any 
funds remaining in the vaults of the bank. Cooper relies on the 
reasoning that "when a bank cashes a check, . . ., it pays out 
its own funds and retains the 'proceeds1 in its own hands. When 
the true owner brings an action against the depository bank to 
recover such proceeds, the owner ratifies the collection by the 
depository bank but does not ratify the payment of funds to the 
forger." Mateo at 1063. Therefore, the bank perpetually retains 
the proceeds of the forged instrument in trust for the true 
owner, unless the bank's own assets dwindle below the amount of 
the check. Cooper at 615. Such reasoning has been regarded as 
defying common sense. Mateo at 1063. 
The court in Knesz regarded "'proceeds' [as the] amount 
received from the drawee-payor bank in return for the check of 
its drawer." The court continues by explaining that "remaining 
proceeds as used in §3-419(3), we believe, connotes the amount, 
if any, the bank actually has left in its control as a 
consequence of dealing with the forged check." at 816. 
The California Supreme Court, in Cooper, has rejected the 
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nearly unanimous assumption in other jurisdictions, that a bank's 
liability may be limited by the Uniform Commercial Code. Note, 
Cooper v. Union Bank: California Protects the True Owner Against 
a Forged Indorsement Despite Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-
419(3), 25 Hastings L.J. 714 (February 1974). 
Essentially what the court did in Cooper was disregard the 
existence of 3-419(3). The element of the argument that makes 
it most inadequate is with regards to its analysis of "proceeds." 
It makes an argument that is essentially a display of circular 
reasoning. The circularity of the courts reasoning can be easily 
seen by analyzing the chronological course of the check.1 Phase 
I. When the forger presents the forged instrument to the 
depositary bank to be processed, the bank gives the forger a 
provisional credit for the amount of the check, and then presents 
the check to the drawee. The drawee then debits the account of 
the drawer and forwards the amount of the check to the depositary 
bank. At this point, the depositary bank becomes the debtor of 
the forger and has the funds to use as its own. However, since 
the drawee paid the wrong person* the "proceeds" have never 
really left the drawerls account. 
Phase II. The forger withdraws his money and leaves town. 
Then the true owner sues the depositary bank. According to the 
ratification theory, because the depositary bank accepted the 
funds from the drawee bank and essentially ratifies the 
1
 The two phase approach to this argument that follows is 
contained in Note, Cooper v. Union Bank, as cited supra at 729. 
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transaction, they become proceeds, which it then holds for the 
true owner. But, before the forgery are discovered the funds 
are considered to be commingled with the depositary bank's other 
funds. Yet, now the money is considered to be proceeds held in a 
discrete quantity for the true owner. The court solves this 
dilemma with constructive trust theory which then allows the 
tracing of the mingled funds. Through this theory of 
constructive trust the court is able to determine that the bank 
always retained the proceeds. However, when the payee ratified 
the exchange of the check, the check should no longer be 
considered converted. If the check is not converted, the true 
owner is then entitled only to its rightful legal remedies. 
These remedies do not include a right on the part of the creditor 
to trace his proceeds as was allowed in Cooper. Depositary Bank 
Liability Under Section 3-419(3) of The Uniform Commercial Code, 
31 Washington and Lee L. Rev. 676, 692-93 (1974). 
"The use of the common law definition of 'proceeds1 in Cooper 
to interpret section 3-419(3) is an example of the use of a legal 
category of 'concealed circular reference.' Considered alone, it 
cannot meaningfully support the court's holding." Note, Cooper v. 
Union Bank, at 730. What this argument amounts to is an outright 
denial to acknowledge the defense provided for by 3-419(3) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The refusal to acknowledge this 
defense, by this court, would be a refusal to acknowledge the law 
as adopted by the state legislature. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Bonneville Bank, respectfully submits that 
based upon the arguments and reasons stated above this Court 
should reverse the district court's judgment and remand for a new 
trial. 
DATED this /B day of January, 1988. 
TTCT.AQ/^ RAYTFR r DOUGLAS^- BAXTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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My name is Jerry G. Brereton, date of birth September 
13, 1951 married to Gayle J. Brereton and home address 610 West 
850 South, Orem, Utah 84 057. I am currently employed by 
Computer Resources, Inc.f 379 N. University, Provo, Utah as a 
salesman. I am on a straight commission with a monthly draw. 
I was employed by Triad Systems Corporation from March, 1979 
to June, 1981. During this time I was ejmployed by Triad Systems 
Corporation I misappropriated funds payable to them from three 
different businesses. The first was Eli Motor Supply, Eli 
Nevada. The amount involved there was $54,000.00. It has been 
all paid to Triad. The others were Five Star Motor Supply, Vernal, 
Utah and Number One Performance, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
amounts I misappropriated from these two sources was $33,000.00 
each or a total of $66,000.00. Of this, $30,000.00 has been paid 
to Triad so the amount I still owe Triad is $36,000.00. Triad 
allowed customers 60 days to make payment so initially I was using 
the payments from customers for my cash flow and making the 
payment to Triad within the time they allowed the customer. 
In the case of Eli Motor Supply, the people with Triad were not 
aware of what I had done until I told them about it in June, 1981. 
I opened an account at the Bonneville Bank, Provo, Utah in the 
name of Jerry Brereton Triad Systems with the office address of 
140 W. 2100 S., Salt Lake City, Utah. j didn't have authority 
Exhibit "A-2" 
from anyone at Triad to open a bank account using their name. I 
first tried to open the account in the name of Triad Systems 
Corporation but the bank wouldn't do it without a corporate 
resolution so I opened the account using just the name "Triad 
Systems". Nobody at Triad was aware that I had the account at 
the Bonneville Bank using their name until June 1981, as far as 
I know. I put the checks I received from these three customers 
in the account at the Bonneville Bank and I made expenditures from 
this account for living expenses and for the house we were building. 
This is the house we now live in. The house has a value of 
$260,000.00 with a mortgage of $98,500.00 to Security Pacific 
Mortgage Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. On May 4, 1981 I took 
cash to Walker Bank & Trust Company, Salt Lake City, Utah where I 
purchased a cashier's check for $10,000.00 payable to Triad 
Systems Corporation. I had the bank put on the cashier's check 
that it was being purchased by #1 Performance. Nobody from 
Number One Performance was aware that I was buying the cashier's 
check using their name. They assumed that the money they had given 
me had been sent on to Triad. The same day I also bought a cashier's 
check for $20,000.00 from Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust payable 
to Triad Systems Corporation with the purchaser being shown as 
Five Star Motor Supply. Nobody from Five Star Motor Supply 
authorized me to buy a cashier's check in their name or was even 
aware I was doing it. I used cash to buy this cashier's check. 
-2-
I believe the cashier's check from Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust 
was dated May 5, 1981 because I purchased it on the afternoon of 
May 4, 1981, The people at Triad learned what I was doing because 
of the discrepancy in the Five Star account. There were contacts 
between Triad and Five Star in May, 1981 that I wasn't aware of at 
the time. In June, 1981 I met in Salt Lake City, Utah with Shane 
Gorman and Mel Call of Triad. In this meeting I told them what I 
had been doing and that it involved Five Star Motor Supply, Number 
One Performance and Eli Motor Supply. In this conversation they 
indicated that their figures showed a shortage of $36,000.00 which 
matches with my figures. I was terminated by Triad at the time of 
this meeting. I believe it was in August, 1981 that I talked with 
an attorney named Thomas Jeffs in Salt Lake City (possibly the name 
of Jeff Thomas) he was representing Triad and contacted me regardin 
payment of what I owe Triad. I intend to pay the money I owe 
Triad as soon as I get a second mortgage on my house. Currently 
this is being delayed because the developer hasn't completed the 
curb and gutter and lenders don't want to make additional loans 
until that is completed. My father, my uncle and I built the 
house. My father, Morris G. Brereton and uncle are both builders. 
My father is actually a cabinetmaker. I do have a copy of a 
mortgage appraisal on the house showing the value to be $242,000.01 
or approximately that amount. I have read these three pages and 
they are true to the best of my knowledge, (signed) Jerry G. 
Brereton 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY G. BRERETON, et al., 
Defendants. 
5RDER 
:iVIL NO. C-82-7259 
On June 24, 1987 this Court entered an Amended Judgment and 
Order wherein it granted the plaintiff Summary Judgment against 
Bonneville Bank, granted Zions First National Bank and First 
Security Bank Orders of Dismissal without Prejudice as to 
plaintiff's Complaint against them, granted Zions and First 
Security Bank's Summary Judgment against Bonneville Bank for 
breach of warranty of presentment, [breach of guarantee of 
endorsement, and breach of contract, and denied all parties 
claims for attorney's fees. This Amended Judgment and Order 
pertained to those motions which were heard on June 7, 1987. 
Bonneville Bank moved for an order granting it a new hearing 
in this matter on the grounds that its attorneys were unaware of 
the Local Rules for Third District Court, thought they had 
additional time in which to obtain affidavits, and alleging that 
the case had been pending for several ye&rs, that an agreement 
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had been reached by all parties for the plaintiff to pursue only 
defendant Brereton and, therefore, no discovery was undertaken 
for those years, and that if Bonneville Bank had time, it could 
have procured affidavits establishing questions of fact requiring 
a trial. 
Later, on July 6, 1987, Bonneville Bank moved to amend its 
Answer to the Complaint to allege contributory negligence. 
A review of this matter is in order. 
The Complaint was filed on September 8, 1982, wherein 
plaintiff sued Brereton for fraud, Zions First National Bank for 
conversion, First Security Bank for conversion, and Bonneville 
Bank for "knowingly or negligently converting or aiding in the 
conversion of property belonging to Triad Systems Corporation." 
On October 15, 1982 Bonneville Bank answered, denying 
charging allegations, and alleging the affirmative defenses of 
estoppel and waiver wherein Triad gave Brereton direct or implied 
authority to negotiate checks written to Triad Corporation. It 
did not plead contributory negligence or any other matters as 
affirmative defenses. 
On October 18, 1982 Zions Bank answered the Complaint, and 
crossclaimed against Bonneville Bank. Zions denied allegations 
and alleged the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, 
estoppel, waiver or release, ratification, insufficient notice, 
laches, 405 and 406 defenses, and lack of capacity or standing to 
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sue. The Crossclaim against Bonneville alleged breach of 
warranty, and/or breach of indemnity, and/or contributory 
negligence. 
On November 4, 1982 Bonneville Bank replied to Zions1 
Crossclaim denying charging allegations, but alleging no 
affirmative defenses. 
On December 13, 1982 a Default Judgment was taken against 
defendant Brereton. 
On July 16, 1986 First Security Bank answered the Complaint, 
and crossclaimed against Bonneville. The bank denied charging 
allegations in the Complaint, alleged the affirmative defenses of 
estoppel, authorization or ratification by Triad, 419(3) defenses 
of good faith consistent with reasonable commercial standards, 
laches, statute of limitations, insufficient claim time, and 
alleging plaintiff had actually received payment. The Crossclaim 
against Bonneville alleged similar allegations to those alleged 
by Zions Bank. 
On December 26, 1986 First Security Bank filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment against Bonneville, and filed an 
affidavit of Joe DeNiro in support thereof. First Security 
alleged that Bonneville was the prior endorser, and thus liable 
to First Security for breach of warranty of good title and 
guarantee of prior endorsement. It alleged each check was 
endorsed by Brereton and presented to Bonneville for deposit in 
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an account opened by Brereton entitled "Triad Systems," that 
Bonneville endorsed each check following Breretonfs endorsement, 
that Bonneville endorsed each check "prior endorsement 
guaranteed,,f that Bonneville presented the check to First 
Security for payment, which was paid by First Security. 
First Security argued that both endorsements warranted that 
they had good title to each check, that Breretonfs fraudulent 
endorsement constituted failure of good title in both Brereton 
and Bonneville Bank, and thus each breached warranty. They also 
argued that Bonneville Bank breached its guarantee of validity of 
all prior endorsements. 
On February 18, 1987 attorney for Bonneville Bank 
acknowledged liability of Bonneville to First Security Bank, and 
indicated a willingness to indemnify First Security, which First 
Security rejected because it made claim to attorney's fees. 
On the same date, Bonneville filed its Memorandum in 
Opposition to First Security's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
offering to sign indemnification agreement with said bank. 
On April 9, 1987, the affidavit of defendant Brereton was 
filed, wherein he admitted the fraudulent scheme, and stated that 
Triad Corporation had no knowledge that he had paid towards the 
Judgment, and that a balance was existing of $26,038.07. 
On the same date plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment against First Security Bank and Zions Bank, arguing that 
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the said banks were strictly liable to the plaintiff in light of 
Section 70A-3-419(1)(c) which provides that: "An instrument is 
converted when it is paid on a forged endorsement." 
On April 14, 1987 Zions Bank filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against Bonneville, with a supporting Affidavit 
of Donald Rocha, which indicated that the checks in question were 
processed on the basis of prior endorsement guarantees by 
Bonneville Bank. 
On April 23, 1987 Zions filed a Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiff's Complaint. 
On the same date, Zions Bank filed a Motion in Opposition to 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that plaintiff's 
recovery should be only against Bonneville Bank as the depository 
or collecting bank which had begun the processing, and that 
plaintiff's action against Zions was not well-founded. The 
foregoing was based upon the argument that by plaintiffs suing 
both Zions Bank (drawee or payor bank) and Bonneville Bank 
(deposirory or collecting bank), the plaintiff had ratified the 
payment of proceeds by Zions to Bonneville Bank. Therefore, 
there was no cause of action for conversion against Zions Bank. 
The plaintiff did not sue Zions Bank for negligence. The only 
theory against Zions Bank was on conversion. Zions relied upon 
Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973). 
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On May 1, 1987 this Court in a handwritten Memorandum 
Decision denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Zions and First Security, indicating that the Cooper case 
was applicable, and granted the Motions of First Security Bank 
and Zions Bank on their Crossclaims, except as to attorney's 
fees. 
On May 26, 1987 plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Bonneville Bank based upon the affidavits filed 
by Jerry Brereton, Joe DeNiro and Donald Rocha. In support 
thereof, plaintiff argued that following the Cooper case, if the 
payor banks (here, Zions and First Security) were free of 
liability because of ratification, then any ratification of 
Bonneville's collections from payor banks did not constitute a 
ratification of Bonneville's delivery to the wrong person, that 
Bonneville retained the check proceeds collected from the payor 
banks in trust for the plaintiff, and plaintiff had a right to 
Judgments on those funds. 
A Notice of Hearing of Summary Judgment was filed with the 
Court on the same date, May 26, 1987, noticing the matter for 
June 8, 1987 at 10:00 a.m. 
On June 8, 1987, the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Bonneville Bank was heard. Attorney Doug Baxter appeared 
for Bonneville Bank. The other parties were represented. The 
Court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and again 
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indicated that the Motions of the payor banks to dismiss were 
granted without prejudice. The claims for attorney's fees were 
denied. 
On June 16, 1987 the Court signed and entered the written 
Judgment and Order granting plaintiff's Summary Judgment against 
Bonneville in the amount of $26,038.07, and dismissing 
plaintiff's claims without prejudice against Zions and First 
Security, and granting the Motions of first Security and Zions 
for Summary Judgment against Bonnevillfe, which actually became 
moot, inasmuch as they were dismissed from the lawsuit. 
On the same date, June 16, 1987, Bonneville Bank filed a 
Motion for a New Hearing, alleging that they had received the 
Summary Judgment on May 29, 1987, that Bonneville's counsel were 
unaware of the Third District's Local Rules, and thought Rule 2.8 
applied, allowing them ten days in which to respond to the said 
motion, that they had made a mistake, and had not had time to 
prepare for the hearing with opposing affidavits, that there were 
material issues of fact that could be raised by affidavits as to 
a 3-419 defense of acting in good faith within commercially 
reasonable standards in cashing the checks of Brereton. This 
motion was supported by an Affidavit of Roger Bjornson, wherein 
he indicated the bank had no knowledge, and that they had acted 
reasonably. 
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On June 26, 1987 the plaintiff filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Bonneville Bank's Motion for New Hearing, taking 
the position that mistake as to Rule 2.8 did not justify a new 
hearing and that the Court could not grant a new trial per Rule 
59, since no specific grounds were stated as required by that 
rule, that there should be no allowance for simply "mistaken 
assumptions,,f and, that in any case, there was no prejudice since 
the Bjornson affidavit was not sufficient in law as required by 
Rule 56, and even if it was, it was irrelevant since Bonneville 
Bank was liable on the checks paid over on Brereton's forged 
endorsements. The plaintiff alleges that 3-419(1)(c) does not 
pertain to Bonneville Bank in this instance, since it is not a 
representative of the type to which that section was intended to 
apply and, in any event, Bonneville Bank holds all proceeds on 
the instruments in trust and, therefore, it is not entitled to a 
good faith defense. The plaintiff cited Goslin v. Cawood, 283 
N.W.2d 691, and Cooper v. Union, 507 P.2d 609. 
On July 6, 1987 Bonneville Bank filed its Reply to the 
plaintiff's Memorandum, pointing out that the Complaint had been 
filed in 1982, that an agreement by all the parties was that 
plaintiff would pursue Brereton, that none of the parties 
undertook discovery during that interim period, that the Motion 
for Summary Judgment was filed on May 26, 1987, and not received 
by the bank until May 29, that the attorneys were unaware of the 
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Third District Rule and were unprepared at the hearing, and that 
under the Rules of Procedure should be granted a rehearing. 
On July 6, 1987 Bonneville Bank filed a Motion to Amend its 
Answer to plead contributory negligence against the plaintiff. 
Defendant Bonneville Bank argues that it thought Rule 2.8 of 
the Uniform Rules of Practice in District Courts was applicable 
and, therefore, was not prepared at the time of hearing on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, even allowing 
plaintiff application of Rule 2.8, instead of the Third District 
Local Rules, defendant did not comply with such rule. Rule 2.8 
requires a responding party in a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
"file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of 
the motion, a statement of answering points and authorities and 
counter affidavits." Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts of the State of Utah. The said rule further provides that 
"decisions shall be rendered without a hearing, unless requested 
by the court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time 
for such hearing." j 
The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was served by 
mailing on May 26, 1987, and actually received by the defendant 
on May 28, 1987. Under Rule 2.8 the said defendant was required 
to serve counter affidavits and a statement of answering points 
and authorities within ten days of May 28, or by June 7 (actually 
June 8, June 8 being a Sunday). No such statement, nor 
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countering affidavits were filed. Therefore, there was nothing 
for the plaintiff to reply to. 
The matter was heard on June 8, 1987, and the said defendant 
appeared through counsel. 
It was only after the hearing on the said Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was granted by the Court that plaintiff filed for 
a new hearing, filed an affidavit, and filed a Motion for Leave 
to Amend its Answer to the Complaint to plead the affirmative 
defense of contributory negligence. 
This matter has been pending since 1982, there have been 
several hearings prior to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
attended by all parties, various pleadings indicate clearly 
issues as to negligence, the said defendant was put on timely 
notice, and received a copy of plaintiff's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities. 
There is no such motion as a motion for "reconsideration" or 
"rehearing." Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346 
(Utah 1983); Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
Bonneville Bank's Motion for a New Hearing is denied. The 
plaintiff's Motion was granted for the reasons set forth in its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and supporting affidavits. 
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Plaintiff's counsel will prepare the Order denying 
Bonneville's Motion for Rehearing. 
Dated this / day of August, 1987. 
fs. 
LEONARD HI RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to the following, this ( 
day of August, 1987: 
David W. Slaughter 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Clifford w. Price 
Attorney for Defendant Zions 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Anthony W. Schofield 
Craig Carlile 
Attorneys for Defendant First Security 
92 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Defendant Bonneville 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
^-tWi, 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy ot the toregoing, postage, 
prepaid this 14 day of January, 1988, to the following: 
David W. Slaughter 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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